This essay examines whether the abolition of Doli Incapax in England and Wales is compatible with the developmental logic of juvenile justice. Before 1998, Doli Incapax functioned as a legal safeguard and required the prosecution to prove that a child aged between ten and fourteen understood that their actions were seriously wrong, rather than only naughty. This reflected a developmental approach that recognised children's limited cognitive capacity. The essay argues that the abolition of the doctrine in 1998 marked a significant shift towards a more punitive, simplified system, in which criminal responsibility is determined primarily by age rather than individual understanding. By analysing legal cases, academic commentary, and policy debates, the essay demonstrates that this change was influenced by political pressure and societal concerns about youth crime rather than developments in child psychology. The findings suggest that the current system risks holding children criminally responsible at an age when their decision-making abilities are still developing. While procedural safeguards and sentencing adjustments remain, they do not fully compensate for the loss of a substantive defense such as Doli Incapax. Overall, the essay concludes that the abolition is only partially compatible with the developmental principles of juvenile justice and raises important questions about fairness, responsibility, and the purpose of the youth justice system.
Research Article
Open Access