Material, instrumental, and emotional dimensions: India’s behavioral logic and identity politics in constructing trust with ASEAN

Jiawei Xiong

doi:10.54254/2753-7102/2025.26047

Article Information

Received: 11 August 2025

Published: 13 August 2025

DOI: https://doi.org/10.54254/2753-7102/2025.26047

Article Type: Research Article

Cite this article

Xiong,J. (2025). Material, instrumental, and emotional dimensions: India’s behavioral logic and identity politics in constructing trust with ASEAN. Advances in Social Behavior Research,16(6),100-115.

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Volume Title: ASBR Vol.16

Part of Series: Advances in Social Behavior Research

ISSN: 2753-7102 (Print) / 2753-7110 (Online)

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